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1 | INTRODUCTION
Tourism ranks among the most important economic activities in the
world. Recent figures from the World Tourism Organisation
(UNWTO, 2018) show that the number of international tourist trips
reached nearly 1.4 billion in 2018, generating an economic impact
estimated in US$ 1.7 billion (and 10 per cent of the jobs in the world).
Despite the fast growth of many competitive destinations, Europe is
still the main tourist destination with 51% of arrivals and 39% of the
total income generated by international tourism.
However, there is also consensus about the substantial negative
impacts of international tourism both at a global scale (mainly air
transport greenhouse gas emissions) and on local communities (i.e.,
environmental externalities such as pollution, congestion and
resource depletion). As tourism depends heavily on the physical
environment but also has a significant impact on it (Tisdel, 2005),
tourism sustainability has become a central issue in the last decades.
A substantial academic debate has focused on the use of measures
and instruments to protect the environment. Under some circum-
stances (Pazienza, 2011; Piga, 2003; Rinaldi, 2014; Schubert, 2010),
the use of tourist related taxes might constitute an efficient way to
cope with tourism related externalities. Partly for these reasons, the
use of environmental taxation in this sector has been receiving
increasing attention in the last decades (Backhaus, 1999; Barde &
Owens, 1996; Cirer Costa & De Ibiza, 2008; Corthay & Loeprick,
2010; Gago, Labandeira, Picos, & Rodríguez, 2006; Gago,
Labandeira, Picos, & Rodríguez, 2009; Gooroochurn, 2004; Hughes,
1981; Rotaris & Carrozzo, 2019; Sheng, 2011; Sheng & Tsui, 2009;
Tavares, 2011).
A great variety of taxes is applied in the tourism industry (Durán
Román, Cárdenas García, & Pulido Fernández, 2020; García, March-
ena, & Morilla, 2018; Gooroochurn & Sinclair, 2005) and these can be
applied by governments to raise funds to offset the environmental
impacts of tourism, as shown by Durán Román et al. (2020) in their
review of tourism taxes in the top 50 tourist destinations. The
OECD (2014, page 76) defines tourism taxes as ‘the indirect taxes,
taxes and tributes that mainly affect the activities related to tourism’
and classifies them into the following types:
1. Arrival and departure taxes (taxes and fees that apply to the depar-
ture or arrival of a country, such as visas and fees for transit and
movement of passengers or crew);
2. Air travel taxes payable at airports and normally applied to airline
trips to cover costs arising from the service provided at airports;
3. Hotels and accommodation taxes (with different names such as
overnight-tax, lodging-tax, bed-tax, occupancy-tax, room-tax, or
accommodation-tax) payable at the accommodation and usually
managed by regional or local administrations;
4. Taxation on consumption, such as value added tax (VAT) or other
taxes on goods and services (although taxation affects tourists and
residents, differentiated tax treatment is sometimes applied to
tourism goods and services);
5. Environmental taxes: although the use of environmental taxes or
eco-taxes is generalised, sometimes there are specific environmen-
tal taxes for tourist activities that attempt to protect natural or cul-
tural spaces of special tourist value; and
6. incentives: tax reductions and exemptions for certain activities that
the government wishes to promote.
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Accommodation taxes (i.e., taxes paid directly by the client at the
hotel, charged for each night of accommodation), are widely applied
specially in the main cities of Europe and are considered the most
common example of tourist-related taxes. Notwithstanding, general
indirect taxes may be preferred to specific taxes as a more feasible,
equitable and neutral way of obtaining tax revenues from tourism
activities (Gago et al., 2009). Nevertheless, when taxes are justified to
overcome the negative effects of tourism activities, Roselló and Sansó
(2017) make the point that the term tourist tax does not refer to a tax
solely paid by tourists, but mainly paid by them (Dwyer, Forsyth, &
Dwyer, 2010). In this way, increases in general taxes (such as VAT) are
criticised, as many of the tourism-related goods are consumed also by
residents who would be paying for external costs that they do not
create.
The distribution of the tax burden and the success of a tourism
tax policy is also affected by the characteristics of the market. For
example, Barnett (1980) shows that the benefit of an optimal tax on a
monopoly can be less than the damage it causes. In fact, a higher tax
would induce the monopolist to further reduce the level of production
and consequently the consumer surplus. Sheng (2017), on the other
hand, advises lower taxes as the market becomes more competitive
and demand more price-elasticity (due to the difficulty of passing on
the tax to tourists), although the existence of negative externalities
may make an increase in taxes advisable. Under a classical Pigouvian
approach, an optimal tax should be equal to the external marginal
damage at the point where social marginal benefits equal social mar-
ginal costs (Pearce and Turner, 1989). Nevertheless, difficulties in the
estimation of benefits and costs makes it difficult to apply optimal
Pigouvian taxes and sub-optimal solutions have been suggested
(Baumol and Oates, 1971), consisting of using cost-efficient taxes to
achieve certain environmental quality standards (not necessarily opti-
mal in the Pigouvian sense).
In the case of tourism, the existence of negative externalities is
the main argument for the use of tourism taxes (OECD, 1989) as a
tool to internalise the costs derived from an excessive boom in visi-
tors. In the case of large cities, with unique attractions and a high
degree of visitor loyalty (such as Venice or Barcelona), studies show
limited effectiveness from tourist accommodation taxes for this pur-
pose, due to the low elasticity of demand (Heffer-Flaata, Voltes-
Dorta, & Suau-Sanchez, 2020). However, this price sensitivity
increases in those destinations with less differentiation and better
substitutes (typically sun and beach destinations), where demand is
more sensitive to price. Thus, the response of tourists to an accom-
modation tax is specific to each place, which would make it advis-
able to carry out specific studies of preferences for each
destination.
Another important reason used to justify the use of accommoda-
tion taxes, in addition to reducing the inefficiencies generated by neg-
ative externalities, is that they have proven to be an important source
of revenue for governments that can be raised from non-residents
and used to improve the attractiveness of the destination
(Gooroochurn & Sinclair, 2005; Palmer & Riera, 2003; Sheng &
Tsui, 2009).
On the contrary, the main argument of the tourism industry
against this type of tax is centred on the possible loss of competi-
tiveness. As Collins and Stephenson (2018) point out, tourists will
seek alternative destinations at a lower price, which can have a sig-
nificantly negative effect in those destinations highly dependent on
tourism. For example, Lee (2014) argued that price increases due to
a bed tax for Midlands Hotels, in the competition between geo-
graphic submarkets, would imply a significant loss of competitive-
ness. Also, even if an increase in the price of accommodation does
not significantly reduce demand for accommodation, it may reduce
demand for other goods given the composite nature of tourism
demand.
Additionally, as Aguiló, Riera, and Rosselló (2005) point out, the
contraction in tourism demand may be greater if the destination of
the tax revenues does not respond to the preferences of tourists or if
these preferences are not used to improve the attractiveness of the
destination (Rotaris and Carozzo, 2019). The level of acceptance of
the tax is affected by factors such as the perceived fairness of the
amount collected (Chung, Kyle, Petrick, & Absher, 2011) as well as the
existence of a clear explanation of the collection mechanism and how
the amount of tax collected will be used (Rotaris and Carozzo, 2019).
Some studies show that tourists are more willing to pay taxes when
they are linked to environmental outcomes (Cantallops, 2004; Lee &
Pearce, 2002), rather than general taxes for tourism development
(Edwards, 2009). Other studies conclude that willingness to pay a tax
for tourist accommodation depends on the profile of the tourist. Thus,
according to Do Valle, Pintassilgo, Matias, and André (2012) in the
case of the Algarve (Portugal), tourists who showed a lower willing-
ness to pay corresponded to the segment of ‘typical sun and beach
tourists’, while the willingness to pay increased as the tourist profile
became more environmentally friendly. Thus, the analysis of tourists'
preferences is one of the most important elements in the success of a
tourism rate. Another important issue is the analysis of the different
preferences between residents and tourists, a comparison that is not
generally addressed in the literature, with some exceptions such as
the studies by Brau, Scorcu, and Vici (2009) and Figini, Castellani, and
Vici (2009) for the case of Rimini in Italy.
In relation to the methodology used to analyse tourism taxes (see
Biagi, Brandano, & Pulina, 2017) we can find different types of
models. A first type uses panel data or time series (Aguiló et al., 2005;
Arguea & Hawkins, 2015; Heffer-Flaata et al., 2020) which allow for
the estimation of tourism demand elasticities and the prediction of
the effects on tourism flows of the imposition of a tax; however, they
have the disadvantage of requiring a series of data over a long period
of time. Other types of models analyse the impacts of taxes from a
macroeconomic perspective considering intersectoral relations using
input–output or general equilibrium models (Forsyth, Dwyer, Spurr, &
Pham, 2014; Gago et al., 2009; Ihalanayake, 2012; Ponjan & Thirawat,
2016; Sheng & Tsui, 2009). Although these are static analyses, these
types of models also require large datasets and are not applicable for
analysing the effects of applying a tourism rate in a specific location.
Most studies analysing the effects of tourism taxes have been
carried out after they have been implemented, so they are ex-post
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analyses the conclusions of which cannot be applied to the design of
the tax. The optimal design of a tax requires estimating preferences
and the response of tourists before applying it, which advises the use
of stated preference techniques such as discrete choice models. Since
scenarios in discrete choice models can be constructed with hypo-
thetical attributes, this technique allows for the estimation of the
reaction to certain policies before they are implemented. However,
the use of these techniques is rare, with a few exceptions such as the
study by Rotaris and Carrozzo who applied contingent valuation to
estimate the willingness to pay for tourism taxes according to the use
of tax revenues in the Italian context.
In the case of tourism, discrete choice models have been applied
in different areas (see the review by Crouch & Louviere, 2000); for
example, to model individual preferences on attributes of the demand
for tourism goods or services (Boto-García, Mariel, Pino, & Alvarez,
2020; Chen, Masiero, & Hsu, 2019; Masiero, Heo, & Pan, 2015) the
choice of destinations (Huybers, 2003), the environmental and recrea-
tional value of cultural or natural heritage (Lee, Mjelde, Kim, Lee, &
Choi, 2019; Lupu, Padhi, Pati, & Stoleriu, 2020; Perez Loyola, Wang, &
Kang, 2019), or the effects of certain policies, such as environmental
conservation policies (see for example, Bocci, Sohngen, Lupi, & Milian,
2020; Xu et al., 2020). Nevertheless, Rosselló and Sansó (2017) noted
two difficulties in applying choice models to assess the effect of a tax
increase on the international demand for a tourist destination: (a) the
use of the distance variable as an indicator of price, makes it impossible
to analyse price increases as a result of the tax, and (b) the difficulty of
having a representative sample of international tourists with informa-
tion about alternative destinations. These difficulties may explain the
scarcity of studies using discrete choice models to analyse the effects
of tourism taxes before applying them to a specific location.
This review of literature allows us to conclude that the design of
a new accommodation tax would be greatly enhanced by having a
previous study about the preferences of both tourists and residents,
specific to the destination. Discrete choice models also allow us to
obtain valuations of the different attributes of a tax and of the pre-
ferred destination of the funds collected, which could condition the
degree of acceptance of the tax. To the best of our knowledge, there
is a scarcity of studies with these characteristics, so the analysis of a
possible room tax opens up the possibility of making a valuable contri-
bution to the existing literature on this subject.
This paper analyses the public's response to a hypothetical room-
tax applied to overnight stays in the Canary Islands. For this we used
an opinion survey, based on a Likert-scale questionnaire, and a dis-
crete choice experiment to estimate the willingness to pay for a
room-tax and the factors that determine its acceptability.
The methodology was applied separately to tourists and residents
of the islands, allowing for a comparison of their preferences. Specifi-
cally, we wanted to answer the following questions:
1. under what conditions would tourists/residents be willing to
accept the introduction of a new tax and, thus,
2. how should the tax be designed to better meet both the prefer-
ences of tourists and residents?
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2
reviews the use of room taxes in Spain; the methodology and field-
work are explained in Section 3; Section 4 summarises the main find-
ings from the opinion survey; Section 5 presents the main results of
our stated choice survey and accompanying discrete choice model
estimation and, finally, Section 6 reveals our main conclusions.
2 | TOURISM ACCOMMODATION-TAXES
IN SPAIN
According to the last figures published by the United Nations World
Tourism Organisation (UNWTO, 2018), Spain was ranked as the second
international tourist destination in 2019 (with 83 million international
arrivals) just behind France (with 89 million). Despite that, there are just
two experiences with using accommodation taxes in Spain: the first, in
the Balearic Islands, which was applied in two periods: from 2002 to
2003 and from 2016 to date (Aguiló et al., 2005; Amer, 2003; Ariño,
2002; Garin-Muñoz & Montero-Martín, 2007; Nadal & Sansó, 2017;
Palmer & Riera, 2003). The second was applied in Catalonia since 2017
(Font-Farolera, Colom, & Imbert-Bouchard, 2018; Goodwin, 2016).
The Balearic eco-tax was initially adopted by the Balearic Islands
government in 2002 (Act 7/2001, 23rd April), but it was appealed by
the Spanish central government, suffered strong opposition from the
tourism companies and was finally abolished in 2003, after a change
in local government (Ariño, 2002; Serra, 2004). During those 2 years,
the eco-tax collected more than €80 million (García et al., 2018) and
the funds were mainly used for conserving and improving green areas,
and to recover environmental damages.
A new tourist tax was introduced in the Balearic Islands on July
1st 2016. Rates varied from €0,5 (for campsites) to €2 (for 5-star
hotels). Nadal and Sansó (2017) estimated the price elasticity of
demand, suggesting reductions between 0.4 and 0.8% in the total
number of tourist's stays with respect to 2014, as a consequence of
the tax implementation. Nevertheless, an increase in both the number
of international arrivals (6.3%) and expenditure (12.2%) was observed1
in 2017 with respect to 2016. The Balearic eco-tax has shown great
capacity to raise funds, with more than €40 million collected in 2016
and €64 million in 2017. From May 2018, the Balearic Islands govern-
ment doubled the rate (now ranges from €1 to €4) collecting over
€120 million in 2018.2
The regional government of Catalonia has also applied a tax on
overnight stays in touristic establishments since November 2012,
popularly known as touristic-tax (Act 5/2012, of 20th March). This tax
was created in a context of public expenditure cuts and shortage of
public revenues, and ranges between €0.45 and €2.25 per person per
day (or day fraction, with a maximum of 7 days), depending on the
category of the accommodation (exemptions apply to visitors under
the age of 16). The funds have to be devoted to projects and actions
with the following objectives: (a) tourism promotion of Catalonia;
(b) fostering the sustainability, responsiveness and quality of tourism,
as well as the protection, preservation and recovery of touristic
resources; (c) promotion, creation and improvement of touristic
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products and (d) development of tourism-related infrastructures
(Decree 161/2013, 30 April).
The revenues raised by this tax were €43.5 million in 2015 (García
et al., 2018) with an annual increase rate of 5.5% between 2014 and
2015. Nevertheless, there is some controversy about how funds
should be distributed among different government levels—regional or
local (Colom, Font-Garolera, & Imbert-Bouchard, 2016). The Barcelona
Council Authority has requested handling 100% of its tourist tax to
tackle the growing impacts of tourism in the city (Goodwin, 2016).
Although the possibility of introducing room-taxes in other Span-
ish regions was a matter of theoretical analysis 20 years ago (Moiche,
1999; Perdomo, 2000), more recently we find some practical studies
focused on the most touristic areas. Table 1 shows the relative touristic
importance of the different Spanish regions. Apart from Catalonia and
the Balearic Islands, the Canary Islands, Andalusia and the Valencian
Community are the most demanded regions by international tourists.
Not surprisingly, these are also the regions that concentrate the scarce
number of studies about room-taxes: Andalusia (García et al., 2018;
Tapias, 2003), Valencia (Gascó, González-Ramírez, Llopis, & Monllor,
2017) and the Canary Islands (Jusmet, Ventosa, & Hercowitz, 2004, for
the case of Lanzarote). So, it may be only a matter of time that new
room-taxes are applied in some of these regions. The delay in applying
the measure may be explained by concerns about its public acceptabil-
ity, mainly from the tourism industry (Cantallops, 2004).
Regarding the acceptability of room-taxes, opposition from the tour-
ism industry and governments in general have been based on the potential
loss of competitiveness of the touristic destinations. This issue is obviously
more relevant for mass tourism destinations, where the strategy is usually
based on maintaining low prices (García & Tugores, 2013). Can-
tallops (2004) reviewed the responses among different stakeholders to the
initial eco-tax in the Balearic Islands, showing a clearly favourable attitude
from tourists, residents, and the trade sector, but a strong opposition from
part of the tourism industry. In general, a similar pattern is observed in any
attempt to discuss this issue in other regions, although there are some dif-
ferences according to the characteristics of tourists (Hall et al., 2016) which
justifies the need to analyse preferences on a case-by-case basis.
Studies analysing these taxes in Spain have focused on their ex-
post effects, that is, after their application. Therefore, they are not
useful for designing a tax to achieve the highest degree of acceptance.
As mentioned above, the use of discrete choice models allows us to
analyse the hypothetical response to an accommodation tax. In the
next sections we apply this approach to the Canary Islands (the third
most important tourist destination in Spain) and carry out a differenti-
ated analysis of the preferences of tourists and residents in the
destination.
3 | METHODOLOGY AND DATA
COLLECTION
3.1 | Methodology
Stated choice (SC) experiments are designed to model individual pref-
erences on the basis of their response to hypothetical choices
(Louviere, Hensher, & Swait, 2000). We will use the SC approach here,
rather than trying to obtain revealed preferences, since environmental
taxes in the Canaries are yet to be implemented.
To examine data obtained in SC experiments we normally use
models based on random utility theory. Under this paradigm, several
classes of models can be estimated (Ortúzar & Willumsen, 2011;
Train, 2009). The simplest one is the multinomial logit (MNL) model,
which assumes that alternatives are independent and homoscedastic,
and that tastes are fixed among the population (McFadden, 1974).
Unlike the MNL, the Mixed Logit (ML) model relaxes all these assump-
tions and also allows for an adequate treatment of the so-called
pseudo panel effect, associated with having several observations by
respondent in SC data (Ortúzar & Willumsen, 2011, Chapter 8). In its
most common specification, the Random Parameters (RP) model, the
vector of parameters βq in the utility function of the ML may vary
across respondents (with a pre-specified distribution), allowing for ran-
dom variation in tastes leading to the following utility specification:
Uqj = βqχqj + εqj ð1Þ
where Uqj represents the utility of alternative j for individual q, xqj are
attributes that describe each alternative and εqj is an independent and
TABLE 1 International inbound tourism by autonomous community in Spain
Autonomous community (ranked by number of tourists
in 2019) 2016 2017 2018 2019
Catalonia 18,139,177 19,118,421 19,196,344 19,358,203
Balearic Islands 12,997,549 13,792,296 13,851,598 13,680,923
Canary Islands 13,259,567 14,214,222 13,752,022 13,147,009
Andalusia 10,589,642 11,518,262 11,681,256 12,079,017
Valencian Community 7,731,770 8,925,959 9,206,908 9,566,566
Community of Madrid 5,783,137 6,699,785 7,139,775 7,638,375
Rest of Autonomous Communities 6,814,166 7,599,577 7,980,510 8,230,918
Total 75,315,008 81,868,522 82,808,413 83,701,011
Source: Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE).
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identically distributed (IID) error term, that follows an Extreme Value
Type I distribution, as in the MNL.
When using SC data, each individual is asked to make several
choices; for this reason, we may also introduce an extra error compo-
nent (assumed to distribute Normal with mean zero and standard
deviation σ) to capture the correlation between individual observa-
tions (Train, 2009). This yields an Error Components (EC) mixed logit
specification, which turned out to be our best specification. In this
case, the parameters are fixed as in the MNL and to allow for hetero-
geneity, we can resort to testing for systematic taste variations
(i.e., interactions of the xqj attributes with socioeconomic or other var-
iables, see Ortúzar & Willumsen, 2011, page 279).
Estimating willingness to pay (WTP) is an important outcome of
discrete choice studies. In its simplest form, the WTP is obtained as
the marginal rate of substitution between the marginal utility of an
attribute of interest and the marginal utility of income. In most cases,
a payment mechanism needs to be used as a proxy for the latter (Jara-
Díaz, 2007), although the selection of an appropriate payment mecha-
nism has not received much attention in the literature. In some cases,
it is fairly straightforward (i.e., the bus fare or parking cost in an exper-
iment involving a transport component, see González, Román, &
Ortúzar 2019), but for non-market goods, such as in environmental or
health economics, it is nearly always necessary to find an indirect pay-
ment (see the discussions in Iglesias, Greene, & Ortúzar, 2013;
Grisolía, López-del-Pino, & Ortúzar, 2015a).
In some occasions taxes may be used for this purpose; in others,
it could be a special contribution or bill related to the good being mea-
sured (i.e., water rates and water pollution). Finally, the payment
mechanism can simply be the price of a complementary good (i.e., the
rent in the case of residential location, linked to certain attributes of
interest such as pollution, see Torres, Greene, & Ortúzar, 2013).
Estimating WTP using the ratio of marginal utilities is only correct
for fixed parameter models and even in that case the ratio of the point
estimates may provide insufficient information, as the parameter esti-
mates are asymptotically Normal distributed variables (Armstrong,
Garrido, & Ortúzar, 2001). In the case of random parameter models,
different methods have been applied in practice but not all of them
are appropriate (see the discussion by Sillano, & Ortúzar, 2005). In
linear-in-the parameters models such as (1), WTP is simply equal to
the ratio of the coefficient of an attribute of interest (say the kth one)





3.2 | Data and experimental design
After two focus groups and considering previous work in the area, we
designed a questionnaire including 17 questions about agreement
with opinions regarding room taxes (using 5 level Likert scales), and a
choice experiment with 12 scenarios per respondent.
To capture the preferences of residents and tourists sepa-
rately, two questionnaires were conducted in Spanish and English.
The Spanish version was distributed using Google forms to resi-
dents of Gran Canaria. The residents have the double characteris-
tic of being recipients of tourism (when they value foreign tourism)
and of being tourists themselves (since a relevant part of the resi-
dents also carry out inland tourism within the Canary Islands dur-
ing their holidays). In the latter case, respondents were asked to
answer the questions of the survey thinking about the last trip
they made within the Canary Islands. Instead, the English version
required face-to-face interviews to external visitors in the most
touristic areas of this island (interviewers were trained university
students, selected from the last course of a tourism degree). A final
random sample of 1052 individuals was achieved (comprising
580 residents and 472 visitors).
Since residents come from all islands, the Google forms were
distributed using a snowball sampling. To check on possible biases
from using different sampling methods for residents and visitors,
we applied the mixed data paradigm (Ben-Akiva and Morikawa,
1990; Louviere et al., 2000) testing the equality of coefficients
assumed in the model estimated with both datasets, against a more
general model allowing for the coefficients to be different in both
samples, and incorporating a scale factor associated with the
potential difference in error variance in both datasets. The scale
factor turned out to be not significantly different from one and a
likelihood ratio test (Ortúzar & Willumsen, 2011, page 325)
allowed us to accept the null hypothesis of equal coefficients at
the 99% level.
Regarding the choice experiment, we considered alternative
types of accommodations for the holidays, described in terms of the
following attributes: accommodation category (two hotel classes,
apartments and rural houses), price (considering a realistic range),
taxes (in line with existing Spanish room-taxes), use of the tax reve-
nues and different tax payment exemptions. A description of the
attributes and levels considered in our choice experiment is given in
Table 2.
We generated 24 scenarios applying a D-efficient design (Rose,
Bliemer, Hensher, & Collins, 2008) using the Ngene software
(Choice Metrics, 2009). Scenarios were blocked into two subsets of
12 each to avoid fatigue and respondent burden (Caussade, Ortúzar,
Rizzi, & Hensher, 2005). In each case, respondents were asked to
choose between two alternatives and a non-purchase option, to
avoid bias (Ortúzar & Willumsen, 2011, page 113) using cards as the
one shown in Figure 1. The room-tax value received a special treat-
ment, as it was presented either as a quantity per night (euros per
person per night) or as a percentage increase over the price of
the room.
4 | OPINION SURVEY RESULTS
The first part of the survey had three general questions about room-
tax acceptance, the results of which are shown in Table 3. The
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percentage of people clearly against room taxes (27.4%) is higher than
that of people clearly in favour (17.6%). Nevertheless, more than half
of the sample (55%) would not be totally against a room-tax if the
question was subject to a clause indicating its ‘correct application’.
Although the questionnaire did not specify what should be
understood by ‘correctly applied’, it serves to show that the position
of not being against the tax could increase to 72.6% depending on the
characteristics of the tax scheme applied. Also, as shown by previous
experience with taxes, people usually reject them before they are
implemented, but acceptance increases once they are applied. The fig-
ures in Table 3 show that the support for a room-tax is roughly twice
as large for people with knowledge or experience about such taxes
than for people who had never heard about them in the past. Also,
visitors show higher acceptance of the tax than residents (22.7 and
13.4% respectively).
In the second part of the survey, respondents had to score their
level of agreement with a series of sentences using a 5-level Likert
scale (ranging from 1: totally disagree to 5: totally agree). Table 4 pre-
sents the main results obtained, by aggregating the answers revealing
disagreement (1 and 2 in the scale) and agreement (values 4 and 5),
and also comparing the opinions between residents and visitors (t-
statistics for a test of difference of means between these two sub-
samples are included in the last column).
In general, 68% of respondents perceive the existence of envi-
ronmental problems caused by tourism, but the figure is significantly
higher for visitors (73.1%) than for residents (63.8%). The perception
of overcrowding problems at the destination is also important
(48.3% agree with this), slightly higher for residents (50.9%). Also,
more than 43% of respondents declare support for the idea of
charging a fee to tourists, although around 32% think that such a
measure would be unfair.
When people were questioned about their expected response
to room-taxes, around 60% declared that they would not be
affected (if the tax was reasonable). In line with this, a majority of
people declared that enforcement of a room-tax would not be a
strong enough reason to look for another destination; this opinion is
statistically stronger in the case of visitors (53%) than residents
(40.5%). When questioned about changes in their spending habits
(question 6), people were evenly distributed showing no clear
response pattern.
On another hand, there is a clear consensus about using the reve-
nues from the room-tax to protect the environment (82.8% of the sam-
ple) and to preserve the cultural and architectonic heritage of the island







per night) a Use of tax revenues Exemptions (yes/no)






Handicapped; Over 7 days stay
Apartment 40; 50; 65
3* Hotel (base) 50; 65; 80
5* Hotel 80; 100; 125
aThe room-tax was also presented as a percentage of the room price.
F IGURE 1 Example of choice scenario [Colour figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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(74.5% agree). These are followed, but far apart, by maintenance of the
touristic infrastructure (58.2%). There are statistically significant differ-
ences between residents and visitors regarding the use of funds for
touristic promotion of the destination (53.1% of residents and 46.2% of
visitors support it). Finally, the use of revenues for non-tourism pur-
poses has the lowest acceptance rates (only about half of the sample
for social purposes and just over a third for pensions).
Considering the application of some kind of discount to the tax,
people agree with them in general (more than 70% of the sample),
especially if they apply to the disabled and to children under 18. Nev-
ertheless, there are statistically significant differences between resi-
dents and visitors in the discounts for children and long stays (mostly
preferred by tourists) and the discount for residents (quite reasonably
preferred by the island residents).




Previously been in an
accommodation with a tourist-tax? Residents Visitors Total
No (n = 362) Yes (n = 690) No (n = 681) Yes (n = 371) (n = 580) (n = 472) (n = 1052)
I am in favour 11.3 20.9 13.5 25.1 13.4 22.7 17.6
If applied correctly, I would not be totally against 54.7 55.2 57.6 50.4 57.6 51.9 55.0
I am against 34.0 23.9 28.9 24.5 29.0 25.4 27.4
TABLE 4 Opinions about a room-tax in gran Canaria (percentage)(Likert scale: 1 totally disagree 5: Totally agree)
Residents (n = 580) Non-residents (n = 473) Total sample (n = 1052)
t-statisticDisag. (%) Agree (%) Disag. (%) Agree (%) Disag. (%) Agree (%)
Tourism Problems
1. Tourism creates environmental problems that need to be
controlled
14.5 63.8 9.1 73.1 12.1 68.0 2.91
2. This tourist destination is overcrowded with tourists 17.9 50.9 19.1 45.1 18.4 48.3 −1.76
Room-tax opinion
3. I am in favour of charging a fee to tourists 32.1 41.9 28.6 45.1 30.5 43.3 0.32
4. I think this type of taxes are unfair 42.2 35.2 52.1 27.8 46.7 31.8 −2.44
Personal adaptation to room-tax
5. If a tourist fee was applied, I would not come here. I would
look for another destination
40.5 29.8 53.0 22.7 46.1 26.6 −3.51
6. If a tourist fee was applied, I would come but I would spend
less on other things
28.6 38.3 35.0 36.9 31.5 37.6 −1.59
7. If the tax was reasonable, I think I would not be affected 20.3 58.3 15.7 61.9 18.3 59.9 0.88
Use of revenues
8. The money of the room-tax should be used to protect the
environment
6.6 83.3 3.4 82.2 5.1 82.8 −1.13
9. The money of the room-tax should be used for tourist
promotion of the Canary Islands
24.3 53.1 27.3 46.2 25.7 50.0 −2.36
10. The money of the room-tax should be used to preserve the
cultural and architectonic heritage
9.0 75.0 8.7 73.9 8.8 74.5 −1.69
11. The money of the room-tax should be used to maintain the
tourist infrastructure
19.3 56.0 16.3 60.8 18.0 58.2 0.53
12. The money of the room-tax should be used for social
purposes (health, education, etc).
27.1 51.4 23.7 47.2 25.6 49.5 −0.31
13. The money of the room-tax should be used to guarantee
the residents' pensions
38.3 35.7 40.7 33.7 39.4 34.8 −1.18
Tax discounts
14. There should be a discount for residents 9.0 79.5 14.8 60.4 11.6 70.9 −7.98
15. There should be a discount for children (less than 18) 12.6 70.0 8.9 79.0 10.9 74.0 2.24
16. There should be a discount for the disabled 12.4 74.0 7.8 77.8 10.4 75.5 1.37
17. There should be a discount for long stay durations (more
than one week)
16.4 68.4 10.8 71.4 13.9 69.8 2.28
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5 | MODELLING RESULTS
With the data described above,3 we estimated an EC mixed logit
model allowing for systematic taste variations, using the freeware
Apollo application in (Hess & Palma, 2019). The final model results are
shown in Table 5. We also tested other specifications, as discussed
below, but the EC model was clearly superior.
5.1 | Overview of results
Constant: We specified an alternative specific constant for the non-
purchase option (NPO). Its negative and strongly significant value
suggests that individuals were rather satisfied with the purchase
options available in the experiment.
Monetary variables: The two monetary variables, price and tax,
presented remarkable differences. Both were significant at the 99%
level, but tax was 31 times larger. The larger coefficient for tax might
be because of the association of price with a private good (hotels) and
tax with a public good (environment). During our specification
searches, we also estimated a random parameters (RP) mixed logit
model with Normal distributed parameters for price and tax. In gen-
eral, the tax parameter was also larger, suggesting that individuals are
unhappier with paying a tax, compared with price. The RP model
allowed us to estimate the negative range of values of each parameter
which was 87% and 74%, respectively, for tax and price (i.e., the
expected number of individuals with a positive sign was not high, see
Sillano, & Ortúzar, 2005).4 It is also interesting to mention that young
people appear to be more willing to pay this tax, since we found a sig-
nificant positive interaction in this case. Thus, acceptance of a room-
tax is presumably larger among the youngest group.
Service attributes: related to the accommodation type. The original
reference alternative (with a parameter fixed to zero) was a three-star
hotel, and we started our specification searches with another three
types: an apartment, a five-star hotel and a rural house (which is also
a popular choice at this destination). However, since the apartment
parameter turned out to be not significantly different from zero, the
reference was changed to being either a three-star hotel or an apart-
ment. From this base, the client could upgrade to a five-star hotel or
to a rural house. Both parameters turned out to be positive and signif-
icant with an almost identical value, so it was eventually merged. It
seems that rural tourism has a potential expansion based on visitors
that are relatively older and are willing to pay more for the extra tran-
quillity and a more direct contact with nature.
Use of revenues: A crucial aspect of this experiment was the
potential use of the tax revenues. Revenue allocation has been deter-
minant in leading public acceptance (see, for example, Grisolía, López-
del-Pino, & Ortúzar, 2015b). In this case, we tested different options,
TABLE 5 Error components model
Attribute General description Value Robust t-ratio
Constant NPO Non-purchase option −2.34 −17.99
Error component Sigma Standard deviation of error component 1.86 25.98
Monetary variables Price Price paid for hotels −0.00526 −4.35
Tax Environmental or Room Tax −0.164 −11.60
Tax  young Tax for young 0.0463 2.65
From 3* hotel to … 5* Hotel/R. House From base (3*hotel) to 5* hotel or rural house 0.183 4.16
Exceptions of payment Children Children are exempted 0.259 10.00
Resident  Resident Residents do not pay, view by residents 0.190 6.08
Handicapped Handicapped do not pay taxes −0.131 −6.22
Preferred allocation of revenues
in relation to protecting
historical heritage
Environment Environmental protection x only young 0.0686 2.30
Promotion Touristic promotion −0.294 −3.09
Promotion  educa Promotion  educated people −0.332 −3.61
Promotion  heard Promotion  heard about taxes before −0.161 −1.75
Promotion  rich Promotion  rich −0.143 −1.10
Social To be used in social benefits 0.123 1.28
Social  educated Social benefits  educated people −0.133 −1.60
Social  heard Social benefits  heard about taxes before −0.260 −3.19
Social  rich Social benefits  rich −0.261 −2.13
Social  young Social benefits  young 0.157 2.05
Observations 11,844
Individuals 987
Log-likelihood at convergence −10810.52
Number of parameters 19
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as discussed in the focus groups, which involved using the money for
either:
• Preserving the historical heritage: The Historical Heritage of the
Canaries Law (Act 4/1999, 15 March) considers different types of
buildings as historical heritage: monuments, historical complexes
(set of buildings, such as a historic city centre), gardens, and other
sites with historical (i.e., linked to historical events), archaeological,
paleontological or ethnological value. Besides, the historical heri-
tage also includes cultural goods and goods such as paintings,
sculptures furniture, and even expressions of popular culture and
traditions.
• Touristic promotion of the islands: mainly supporting marketing cam-
paigns in international Tourism Fairs with the aim of increasing the
islands' attractiveness as a touristic destination and, thus, the num-
ber of international tourist arrivals.
• Environmental preservation and recovery: dealing with any action to
improve the quality of the environment, reduce the negative
impacts from tourism (on water, air and soil) and preserve the natu-
ral islands' values (landscape, wildlife and flora); although an impor-
tant part of the territory is under some degree of environmental
protection, the natural resources in the archipelago, as a whole, are
still under great pressure due to mass tourism activities.
• Social needs: using the tax revenues to finance social services, such
as the local health system, support the pensions system or any
other social need; although it was not clearly stated what social
benefits were considered, this use reflected any other uses of the
funds not directly related to the tourism activity.
In this case, the reference allocation was historical heritage. Thus,
every coefficient represents the variation of utility if revenues were
spent in another way. As an average, individuals prefer that revenues
are used for environmental purposes. This preference is very strong,
with a remarkably positive and significant coefficient. It comes with-
out saying, that this preference is quite sensible since we are examin-
ing an environmental tax.
On the other hand, touristic promotion turned out to be negative:
all respondents appeared to dislike the idea that money was spent in
promoting tourism, but we found a considerable degree of heteroge-
neity; those who especially disliked it were the more educated, the
wealthiest, and those who had heard about environmental taxes. The
general rejection to promotion can be explained by the implicit con-
tradiction in collecting a tax to curb excessive demand and then use
revenues in increasing demand through marketing. That position was
raised during the focus group sessions.
Spending the revenues in social benefits instead of protecting the
historical heritage, revealed a weak preference; it was only really
supported by the young and rejected by the rest of the groups. It
seems here that youngsters have a particular ranking, where social
benefits occupy the first priority, followed by historical heritage. Finally,
as most people are happy with historical heritage as a priority spend-
ing, this use of the funds should be included among the priorities for
spending.
Exemptions: refers to what extent individuals agree that in certain
situations, or for certain individuals, the tax should be zero. In general,
people rejected any exemptions with two exceptions: residents and
those who travel with children; however, the exemption for residents
was only significant for the residents in the sample.
Correlation across choices: sigma is the standard deviation of the
Normal error component; it allows to consider the potential correla-
tion in the 12 responses of each individual; the strongly significant
estimated value supports the importance of considering this effect.
5.2 | Heterogeneity
We have referred already to systematic taste variations and the analy-
sis of preferences when social interactions are considered. In this
section we will create a taxonomy of individuals in the sample using a
method proposed by Amaris et al. (2020). The idea is to select the
most relevant socioeconomic characteristics in the model to create
types of individuals, and segment the sample considering a combina-
tion of these variables; then, estimate the weights of every segment
in the sample (see Table 6) and, finally, determine the probability of
rejecting a taxed hotel for every segment. The idea is to estimate the
acceptability of a room tax per segment, and for that we considered
three possible revenue allocations: environmental protection, heritage
protection and social benefits. We did not include touristic promotion as
it was clearly unpopular.
Table 7 shows the probabilities of not choosing the NPO alterna-
tive, that is, the impact of a room-tax for the three selected use of
revenues, considering the range of taxes in the experiment. Results
are the difference in market shares versus a tax = 0, a situation which
represents the status quo. As can be seen, even for a tax of €4 per
day, the impact on the market is limited, and clearly the best strategy
seems to promote the tax as a means to protect the environment.
Therefore, for the maximum value of the tax (€4), hotel demand would
be reduced by 4% in the worst of cases.
It is interesting to combine these results with the profile types of
Table 6; for example, what would be the market share of a room-tax
equal to €4/day, when the funds are allocated to protect the environ-
ment for a given respondent type?
In Table 8, we represent the rejection rate (i.e., choosing the
NPO) for this case, combined with the size of each segment. To arrive
at this result, we calculated the market shares for every alternative







fj Xqð Þ ð3Þ
where Pjq represents the market share of alternative j, which is
obtained by averaging the probability of choosing this alternative for
the entire sample. The market reductions in Table 8 might represent a
choice outside the Canary Islands, since all hotels are taxed in this
example. First, note that rejection rates are again very low (i.e., at the
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maximum it is less than 5%). Second, the variability among the various
segments is also small.
The larger rejection rates correspond to segments 3, 4, 9 and
11 and the largest is for segment 4 (4.47%), which represents men,
holding a degree, older than 40, without previous knowledge about
the tax, and with low income. On the other hand, segments 9 and
11 incorporate non-degree holders, above 40 years, with and without
previous knowledge.
The combination with the size of the segments does not bring a
clear picture. For instance, the largest segment, representing 11.65%
of the sample (type 22: women, degree holder, and below 40 years
old), shows a low rejection rate. Analysing the data carefully, we find
that the only clear pattern here is age: with youngsters showing a
higher degree of acceptance compared with individuals above
40 years old (shadowed with grey).
5.3 | Willingness to pay
As explained before, for linear-in-parameters utility functions, the WTP
is given by the ratio of the parameter corresponding to the attribute of
interest and the cost parameter. To obtain confidence intervals in this
case, we applied the method proposed by Armstrong et al. (2001).
Since we have two monetary attributes (tax and price) we can, in
principle, calculate the confidence intervals using either parameter.
Now, since the parameter of the tax attribute is much larger, we
would expect considerable differences (i.e., much smaller WTP when
the parameter of tax is used). We gave some thought to this problem
and decided that a sensible way forward was to link the monetary val-
uation with the cost attribute that was more appropriate in each case;
TABLE 6 Segmentation of the sample
Type of respondent
Education Age Knowledge High income
Share of respondents (%)
Male Female Male Female
1 17 Degree holder Above 40 Yes Yes 1.62 1.42
2 18 No 3.34 5.47
3 19 No Yes 0.20 0.30
4 20 No 1.01 1.32
5 21 Below 40 Yes Yes 2.12 1.72
6 22 No 6.18 11.65
7 23 No Yes 0.40 0.92
8 24 No 3.14 6.99
9 25 Non degree holder Above 40 Yes Yes 1.01 0.71
10 26 No 7.70 8.11
11 27 No Yes 0.10 0.81
12 28 No 3.45 3.95
13 29 Below 40 Yes Yes 0.60 0.50
14 30 No 4.86 8.00
15 31 No Yes 0.20 0.30
16 32 No 5.78 6.08
TABLE 7 Market shares of a room taxed hotel versus NPO (%)
Resource allocation/tax (€) 0.5 1 4
Environmental protection 99.65 99.30 96.59
Historical heritage 99.64 99.25 96.37
Social protection 99.60 99.16 95.98
TABLE 8 Market share of room taxed hotel versus NPO
Type of respondent Sample weight (%) Market reduction (%)
Male Female Male Female Male Female
1 17 1.62 1.42 4.20 4.12
2 18 3.34 5.47 4.30 4.13
3 19 0.20 0.30 4.56 3.97
4 20 1.01 1.32 4.47 4.00
5 21 2.12 1.72 2.76 2.69
6 22 6.18 11.65 2.68 2.67
7 23 0.40 0.92 2.61 2.73
8 24 3.14 6.99 2.68 2.68
9 25 1.01 0.71 4.42 4.00
10 26 7.70 8.11 4.06 4.14
11 27 0.10 0.81 4.40 4.31
12 28 3.45 3.95 4.08 3.97
13 29 0.60 0.50 2.70 2.88
14 30 4.86 8.00 2.58 2.62
15 31 0.20 0.30 2.76 2.74
16 32 5.78 6.08 2.51 2.56
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that is, the price for the service attributes related to the accommoda-
tions; and the tax for attributes that described its particular character-
istics (i.e., revenue allocations). These has been highlighted in grey in
Table 9.
In summary, according to our model individuals would be willing
to pay between €20.37 and €55.53 to be upgraded from a three-star
hotel or an apartment to a five-star hotel or rural house; this is coher-
ent with the actual range of prices in the islands.
In relation to the use of revenues, recall that the reference use of
the room-tax funds was to preserve the islands' historical heritage.
Given this, our results imply that only young people would be willing
to pay a premium if the tax money was used to protect the environ-
ment. Our results also imply that individuals are against using the tax
revenues for touristic promotion. Finally, using the room-tax funds for
social protection is only accepted by young people and non-educated
and relatively poor individuals who have never heard about the tax.
Their premium, though, is larger compared with using the funds to
protect the environment.
Considering the rejection rates in our model, we can simulate the
effect of a tax accounting for revenues and the decrease in visitors.
According to the Spanish National Statistics Institute, 13.1 million
tourists visited the region in 2019 (INE, 2019). The average length of
each visit was 6.8 days with a daily spending of €138 (ISTAC, 2019).
However, a breakdown of these expenses reveals that only €98.5 of
them would remain in the archipelago, as the rest was part of the jour-
ney paid at the origin.
Using this information, we found that a tax of €1 would reduce
the number of visitors by 91,838 (i.e., 0.6%) but would still generate
over €88 million in revenues per year, clearly offsetting any losses in
the sector. By the same token we estimated the break-even tax in
€6.17.Therefore, it seems that there are possibilities to apply a tax to
tourism in the Canary Islands, as described above, starting with cau-
tiously reduced values similar to those currently applied in other tour-
ist destinations in Spain.
6 | CONCLUSIONS
We analysed the acceptance of a room tax in the Canary Island and
forecasted its impact on touristic demand following a dual approach:
(a) a qualitative questionnaire with opinions graded on Likert scales
and (b) a stated choice exercise followed by the estimation of a flexi-
ble discrete choice model.
We were able to answer the research questions posed initially.
Our qualitative data reveals polarised opinions about this type of tax,
with 27% of respondents clearly against it and 17% in favour. How-
ever, the majority of individuals (55%) gravitated around a conditional
acceptance of a well-managed tax. Further, as individuals gain experi-
ence with these taxes, through knowledge or previous travels, they
tend to increase their degree of acceptance. In this sense, interna-
tional travellers seem to be less reluctant to such a taxation system. In
addition, the majority of respondents stated that a room-tax would
not deter them from visiting the Canary Islands.
These results were confirmed by our quantitative analysis. Our
best model specification suggests that although the tax is not popular,
the demand response is inelastic. In fact, our model predicts a reduc-
tion in demand of about half a point (i.e., less than 92,000 people)
from the application of a €1 tax, as well as revenues of around €88
million.
Our model also shows that the proper allocation of tax revenues
is a very important contributor to a general acceptance of this type of
taxes. Protecting historical heritage and the environment are the
favourite options. Notwithstanding, younger sample members appear
to be willing to pay a small premium for securing the tax revenues are
used for environmental protection rather than caring for the historical
heritage. It is important to avoid using the tax revenues in touristic
promotion, a sort of contradictory loop that is negatively perceived by
respondents. Some exemptions to the tax, such as resident and chil-
dren, could also increase the popularity of the measure. Finally, we
found that the degree of acceptance of the policy increases notably
among younger people.
Therefore, we can conclude that there seems to be room for a
room-tax in the Canary Islands, considering the estimated impact
on demand and its degree of acceptance. A moderate tax of
between 1 and 2 euros per night (similar to those already applied
in other tourist destinations in Spain) would be advisable, to start
with, if the tax revenues are intended to increase environmental
protection and/or preserve the historical and natural heritage of







TABLE 9 Confidence intervals for WTP
Estimated using Price (€) Estimated using Tax (€)
Upper limit Point estimate Lower limit Upper limit Point estimate Lower limit
From base (3*hotel) to 5*hotel or rural house 55.53 34.79 20.37 1.75 1.12 0.54
From base (historical heritage) to Env. protection (only young) 29.98 13.04 1.95 0.80 0.42 0.06
touristic promotion −25.32 −55.89 −92.54 −0.64 −1.79 −3.07
social benefits 90.46 23.38 −10.20 1.91 0.75 −0.41
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3 We removed 63 respondents that always chose the same alternative.
They might be lexicographic (non- traders) or did not understand the
questionnaire.
4 In a RP model it is assumed that each parameter distributes randomly
across individuals in the sample. We typically choose a Normal distribu-
tion and during model estimation we obtain the mean and standard devi-
ation of this distribution (the so-called population parameters). For this
reason, we are able to estimate the percentage of individuals that are
within a particular range of values (Sillano and Ortúzar, 2005).
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